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Why Distributive Justice Is Impossible but 
Contributive Justice Would Work
PAUL GOMBERG*
ABSTRACT: Distributive justice, defined as justice in distribution 
of income and wealth, is impossible. Income and wealth are dis-
tributed either unequally or equally. If unequally, then those with 
less are unjustly subject to social contempt. But equal distribution 
is impossible because it is inconsistent with bargaining to advance 
our own good. Hence justice in distribution of income and wealth 
is impossible. More generally, societies where social relations are 
mediated by money are necessarily unjust, and Marx was wrong 
to think a socialist society which retained money would lead to 
communism. Contributive justice proposes that each flourishes by 
advancing the flourishing of others. To achieve this goal all labor, 
both simple and complex, must be shared among all capable of 
doing it. The good of contributing our abilities to benefit others 
is then available to all non-competitively.
1. Introduction
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, CONCEIVED AS just  distribution of income and wealth, is impossible — for reasons to be explained. Social justice concerns how institutions affect 
people’s lives for better or worse. When the quality of a person’s 
life depends on access to money — on income and wealth — this 
* Ancestor drafts of this paper benefitted from criticism from David Schmidtz, David Copp, and 
Serena Olsaretti. It was the subject of a colloquium at Indiana University/South Bend, where 
Mahesh Ananth acted as gracious host and made a decisive criticism; a colloquium of the 
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, in 2010, where Alastair Norcross was a 
helpful commentator; and a colloquium at the 2010 meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, where Frank Lovett made several useful criticisms. More final drafts were given 
thorough and beneficial criticism from Russell Dale and Justin Holt of Science & Society.
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dependence harms many people unjustly. While theories of distribu-
tive justice typically focus on income and wealth, contributive  justice 
would create social conditions enabling all to live well and to earn 
respect for their social contributions; each flourishes by advancing 
the flourishing of others, or, in Marx and Engels’ phrase from The 
Communist Manifesto, “the free development of each is the condition 
for the free development of all” (Marx and Engels, 1973, 87). I show 
how contributive justice is possible.
The leading proponent of the distributive paradigm, John 
Rawls (1999; 2001), combines market-based social relations (what 
he calls “property-owning democracy”) with institutional structures 
intended to create egalitarian justice (fair equality of opportunity, 
broad dispersal of property and the powers consequent on property 
ownership). The present paper argues, from sociological and social 
psychological principles, that any possible money economy either 
leads to injustice or proposes something that makes no sense. The 
argument is not against Rawls alone (but I write with him in mind), 
nor is it conclusive; it should be plausible enough to get a hearing 
for contributive justice.
Income and wealth are central to justice, for Rawls and others,1 
because they are all-purpose means by which people may advance 
their own conceptions of the good; in this way a conception of justice 
can be neutral between different conceptions of the good, neither 
promoting an ideal of life which constrains people’s choices about 
how to live nor relying on controversial ideas of what makes life 
good. On this view a just society has a just distribution of income 
and wealth; each person’s monetary resources allow her to live as 
she chooses.
However, a just distribution of income and wealth is impos-
sible. Income and wealth will be distributed either unequally or 
equally. If wealth and income are unequal, those with less, I argue, 
suffer unjust harms. But, for reasons to be explained, an equal 
distribution cannot be sustained. Since equal distribution can-
not be sustained and unequal distribution leads to unjust harms, 
1 The others include Ronald Dworkin (1981; 2000), Richard Arneson (1989; 1999), G. A. 
Cohen (1989; 2000; 2008; 2011), most participants in the equality versus priority debate, 
and capability theorists such as Amartya Sen (1992; 1999; 2009) if they endorse market 
economies — as Sen does (1999, 111–46, especially 112). For the equality versus priority 
discussion see Clayton and Williams, 2002.
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distributive justice, understood as just distribution of income and 
wealth, is impossible.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 considers the con-
sequences of inequalities of income and wealth; section 3 explains 
why equal distribution of income and wealth cannot be sustained. 
In section 4 I summarize and explain how the argument defeats all 
conceptions of social justice that would allow money and markets; 
moreover, this argument is a criticism of Marx’s “first phase of com-
munist society” (Marx, 1974b, 347). Section 5 develops and defends 
a contributive conception of justice based not on what we receive 
but what we can contribute; contributive justice corresponds to the 
principle of contribution and distribution — “From each according 
to his abilities, to each according to his needs” — of Marx’s “more 
advanced phase of communist society” (Marx, 1974b, 347). In sec-
tion 6 I consider how we can get to a society of contributive justice 
from current capitalist injustice.
2. Supposing Unequal Distribution of Income and Wealth: 
The Rationalization Principle and Perceptions of Social Justice
Suppose income and wealth are distributed unequally. Money is an 
all-purpose means by which we advance our ends. Then for each of us it 
is a good in two senses: first, it enables us to reach certain goals; second, 
a consequence of the first, we regard it as good for us. So money is nearly 
universally thought of as a good. There may be exceptions. Some may 
believe it has pernicious effects. But even for them it is useful. The only 
conclusion I need for the rest of the argument is this: generally (if not 
universally) money is thought of as a good thing.
People tend to rationalize stable social institutions. Why would 
they do this? Possibly to reduce emotional dissonance. Stable social 
institutions tend to appear unchangeable. The thought that some-
thing is unjust sparks desire for change; the thought that an injus-
tice will not change is depressing. To reduce the conflict between 
the desire for change and the thought that change will not occur, 
people tend to rationalize stable institutions, specifically to think 
them just. Let us call this tendency the Rationalization Principle. 
The speculation I have given of the origin of the Rationalization 
Principle may be incomplete; still, the principle names a tendency 
in all human societies: to the extent that they are stable and the 
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possibility of social change becomes invisible, we rationalize our 
society by thinking it just.2
The Rationalization Principle should not be taken to imply that 
everyone thinks the social order just. It does imply, however, that asser-
tions that a society is unjust are challenges to its continuing; if widely 
accepted, they tend to destabilize it.
2.1 Esteem for the Wealthy, Contempt for the Poor. The Rationalization 
Principle has further consequences. If money is an important good 
for each of us (even if only as a means) and if the social institutions in 
which it is a means are just, then people generally deserve the good 
things that they have. If some have more money than others, then 
they must be better in a relevant way (since the institutions are just 
and money is, for everyone, a good). I am not referring to the asser-
tions of any theory: Rawls denies that in a just society people deserve 
their natural talents and advantages of birth and sometimes the mate-
rial advantages they may have as a result of them;3 Hayek, Hume, 
and Rawls all argue against distribution according to merit or virtue 
(Hayek, 1984; Hume, 1975, 92–93; Rawls, 1999, 273–74). To think 
that people deserve what they have is a tendency in people’s beliefs, 
an effect of rationalization: if those who have more good things are 
thought not to deserve them, then — to that extent — the society is 
thought to be less just than it might be. The belief that higher income 
and wealth are not earned through merit but result from luck or 
even injustice would be destabilizing. Obviously, if the Rationalization 
Principle correctly identifies a social tendency, stable societies tend 
to spawn conservative social thought.
Rationalization is a tendency; other tendencies reinforce ratio-
nalization or push our thinking in other directions. Specifically, we 
tend to defend our egos. People can believe (due to ego defense) 
that those above  them in the hierarchy of wealth or income got there 
because they are lucky or unprincipled. Let me explain. If, due to my 
rationalizing wealth inequalities, I believe that those who have more 
wealth than I do deserve it and got it through greater intelligence 
2 The idea of rationalizing what exists is entrenched in much Marxist literature as the source 
of ideology; see, for example, Fields, 1990, 106.
3 See Rawls, 1999, 89 on not deserving our talents; in pure procedural justice the outcomes 
of a just procedure are just, whatever they happen to be (74). So people are entitled to 
the material goods they have (but they may not deserve them — see 276 for the distinction 
between entitlement and desert and 273 and 276 for the distinction between moral desert 
and a non-moral sense of desert).
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than mine (smarter investments) or moral superiority to me (greater 
ability to restrain irrational impulses), then I diminish myself and 
undercut my self-esteem. Because we defend our egos, we are usu-
ally very reluctant to admit that those above us are superior to us. 
So ego defense may lead us to believe that those above us benefitted 
from advantages, were just lucky, or got to higher positions by being 
unscrupulous and unprincipled.
Those in economically superior positions tend to rationalize what 
exists by thinking that those below them are inferior. Rationalization 
and ego defense work in concert. Rationalization says that those with 
more wealth are superior in some way relevant to their having more, 
but this belief also inflates the egos of the wealthy. For members of the 
working class as well rationalization and ego defense may converge. 
When workers compare themselves to others who are worse off than 
themselves, they may experience a sense of superiority which rational-
izes the system of inequality and enhances their egos.
Being further down in the hierarchy may cause us to regard more 
peoples’ successes with suspicion. We may defend our egos and reject 
the idea that we are inferior.
But not all of us do; when rationalization subjects poor people 
to social contempt, some internalize this contempt, paying a price 
in lowered self-esteem. The Rationalization Principle explains why 
the poor are subject to contempt; research verifies that such feel-
ings, often racialized, are often directed toward people who are 
worse off.4
Where there is inequality of income and wealth, there is a mone-
tary hierarchy. The belief that people have what they deserve rational-
izes this hierarchy. Those who have more think themselves superior 
to folks who have less. The former receive more social esteem, the 
latter less. We can observe the harms of rationalization in our society, 
as Michele Lamont’s and Andrew Sayer’s research shows. What I add 
here is that the same contempt for the poor that we can now see as 
4 For evidence of both tendencies (looking down on those less well off and resenting those 
better off) see Sayer, 2005; Lamont, 2000, ch. 3.
  The ways people perceive economic self-interest — this is different from ego-defense — can 
lead people to demean others perceived as competitors for important goods, people closer  to 
their social position. Some antagonism within the working class, including racial antagonism, 
can be explained in this way. White workers have often felt threatened by struggles against 
racial injustice as they may fear falling from their own fragile position. Black workers may 
direct resentment more at white workers closer to their own social position than at capitalists.
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an effect of rationalization will exist in any money-based society as 
contempt for those who have less.
Granted, most of us value things other than money, and many 
disparage acquisitiveness and look down on “money-grubbers.” More-
over, in societies with more compressed income and wealth differences 
both the physical and psycho-social harms to people lower down in 
the hierarchy may be less; I only insist that the harms would still be 
present and significant.
Rawls and especially Joshua Cohen try to defuse this problem 
by claiming that the status of equal citizenship would, in a just society, 
provide each with respect that would sustain our sense of self-worth 
( J. Cohen, 1997). However, this solution does not work. Let us sup-
pose, with Rawls, that recognition of our status as a citizen provides 
equal and unconditional respect to each as a citizen. Nevertheless, it 
does not provide us with the respect we need. We need respect for our 
individual accomplishments, and — an effect of rationalization — our 
lower income and wealth operate as signs of inferior accomplishments 
and thus as a source of social contempt. Cohen also develops Rawls’ 
argument that in a just society the difference principle (maximizing 
resources for people in the worst-off position) provides “the social 
bases of self-respect” to the least advantaged, because they are as well 
off as is possible, thus providing them with maximal resources to 
advance their own conception of the good and acknowledging their 
contributions to society.5 Still, their lower income and wealth operate 
as signs of inferior contributions.
In §§80–83 Rawls addresses the “excusable envy” that could be a 
consequence of inequalities sanctioned by the difference principle. 
Excusable envy felt by the disadvantaged toward those more advan-
taged is grounded in visible disparities in income and wealth, which 
are likely to be much less in a just society than now. (Rawls calls these 
harms of social comparison envy. I believe that the pain is a response to 
the feelings of superiority of the advantaged and perhaps shame about 
one’s own lesser position, feelings that are effects of rationalization.) 
Rawls adds that “the plurality of associations” makes the remaining 
5 See J. Cohen, 1989; Rawls, 1999, 448. Rawls is explaining how those who were less well off 
would think about their own lesser opportunity even with equality of fair opportunity: “We 
are more ready to dwell on our good fortune now that these differences are made to work 
to our advantage, rather than to be downcast by how much better off we might have been 
had we had an equal chance along with others if only all social barriers had been removed.”
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disparities less visible and hence less painful, dividing society “into so 
many non-comparing groups, the discrepancies between these divi-
sions not attracting the kind of attention which unsettles the lives of 
those less well placed” (1999, 469–70).
This is certainly true now: social segregation, by race and also by 
class, reduces social contacts across both race and class and hence open 
displays of inequality which can spark feelings of shame in those less 
well off and superiority in the better off. But is this social segregation 
a good thing? Is it even tolerable? It represents our inability to create 
a human community, a world where all can be esteemed simultane-
ously by shared norms of esteem.
To understand the problems consider the segregation of the poor, 
particularly those who are racially stigmatized. Most social contacts are 
with others who are not distant from their own status position, that 
is, with people who are similarly poor. This segregation saves people 
the pain of frequent interactions with others who look down on them 
on account of their poverty. Yet the segregation has costs of its own. 
First, it locks people more deeply in their disadvantage by depriving 
them of skills and confidence that would help them either advance 
their interests (as, for example, in a job interview) or negotiate their 
interests with others above them; it can make people fearful of enter-
ing public spaces, even downtown streets, where they may be subject 
to contempt. Second, burying the pain of social comparisons does 
not eliminate the pain but puts it in a deeper place; whether they 
acknowledge it to others or even to themselves, poor people pay a 
big price in self-esteem when they are socially segregated, whether by 
economic or racial criteria. So whether they are socially segregated 
or share the same social space, those who are most disadvantaged are 
subject to social contempt.
To defeat this argument one could argue that it depends on the 
assumption that money can buy prestige but that in a just society just 
this sort of fungibility of money would be prevented; the norms which 
determine social esteem would be separate from the norms which 
determine how much money one gets (Walzer, 1983). However, a 
better understanding of how human societies rationalize inequalities 
shows that those with money will inevitably be thought better than the 
poor; money will be an important determinant of prestige.
2.2 Positionality Intensifies the Harm of Rationalization. I have argued 
so far that where societies are stable, inequalities in income and wealth 
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tend to generate inequalities in social esteem, due to the effect of 
rationalization, and that inequalities in esteem harm those who have 
less. Because money is a source of esteem, it becomes not just an 
instrumental good but a positional  good. A good is positional to the 
extent to which its value derives from its conveying rank relative to 
others (Hirsh, 1976). To the extent that X amount of money func-
tions socially as a mark of position in the hierarchy of social esteem 
(an effect of rationalization) money becomes a positional good as does 
social esteem. Contests for positional goods are zero-sum: one person’s 
gain is another’s loss.
When the goods valued in a society are sought for their positional 
value, people do not become happier over time. Even as the society 
may become more affluent and people have more consumer goods, 
people’s sense of well being does not improve. When people strive 
for status by trying to accumulate money and things or in other ways, 
things tend to go worse for them, and they suffer from more unhap-
piness, alienation, and depression. People whose values are focused 
on friendship and family do better psychologically.6
The negative effects of status rivalries are worth stressing. The 
more concerned we are with our status relative to others, the more 
jealous we become of others’ accomplishments; it becomes harder to 
praise spontaneously others in a status similar to ours; it is harder to 
enjoy the accomplishments of even our friends. Others’ accomplish-
ments can seem a (relative) diminishment of our own. (Rousseau’s 
discussion of amour propre  is helpful here.) While this may seem a 
caricature of people’s psychology (and it holds little truth about the 
psychology of people unconcerned with relative status), it captures 
the ways that rivalries can poison relationships.
Current theories of distributive justice advocate mediating human 
relationships through money and markets. But then money will func-
tion as a sign of worth, harming those with less. Positionality intensifies 
the harms done by rationalization. Positionality of wealth and esteem 
gives each an interest in diminishing the contributions and worth of 
6 See Hirsh, 1976 and Layard, 2005 for evidence that greater social wealth does not lead to 
greater happiness. Tim Kasser’s The High Price of Materialism (2002) reviews research show-
ing the harmful psychological effects of materialism and status strivings and the better 
psychological profile of people whose values are oriented toward family and friends. Kasser’s 
research is part of a large body of work on issues of motivation and flourishing under the 
paradigm of Self-Determination Theory, pioneered by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan at 
the University of Rochester (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
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those who are less well off, particularly those close to their own status 
position.
These arguments that a so-called “distributively just” society would 
lead to unjust harms are external  in this sense: theories of distributive 
justice do not imply these harms as consequences of those theories 
apart from the psychological considerations I have raised. Rather, I 
am arguing that if such a “distributively just” society were to exist, then 
those with less money in that society would be harmed. The harms are 
the result of rationalization, which I have proposed as a psychologi-
cal tendency in stable societies, but the Rationalization Principle is 
my principle and is external to those theories of distributive justice.
2.3 Socialization: Why Competition Cannot Be Fair. I have argued that 
inequalities in income and wealth harm those with less, but I have 
not shown that this is an injustice; if the harm results from choices 
for which those harmed may be rightly held responsible, it may not 
be an injustice. If, however, it results from socialization for inferior 
social positions, then it is an injustice. Specifically, economic and 
racial segregation of neighborhoods and schools (as well as different 
educational and social resources parents bring to childrearing) shape 
the aspirations and expectations of children from early in life, so that 
some children aspire to be architects and engineers while others aspire 
to be hair stylists and security guards. Moreover, children’s abilities 
are socialized so that some are admitted to elite schools and others 
are not. For example, in a survey of 146 elite colleges it was found 
that only 3% of the students were from families in the bottom 25% 
in income and only 10% of students were from the bottom 50% in 
income (Carnevale and Rose, 2004).7 Hence the opportunity to attain 
economically advantaged positions is unequal, and the competition 
for them is unfair.
Some people must be socialized for inferior social positions. To 
explain this I need to introduce the Socialization Principle, which 
holds that children are socialized for available opportunities in num-
bers approximating those opportunities. No society will socialize many 
to do what only a few can do. The reason the Socialization Principle 
tends to be true is that socializing many to do what only a few can 
do frustrates ambitions; frustrated ambitions make people unhappy; 
7 Wealth inequalities are much greater than income inequalities and often more greatly affect 
opportunities. See Conley, 1999.
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unhappy people will tend to cause trouble, destabilizing society. Social-
ization reduces competition and hence frustration by discouraging 
some from competing; it also gives some competitors an advantage. 
Thus the Socialization Principle identifies a tendency  in stable societies 
to socialize people, particularly the young, for available opportuni-
ties in numbers that approximate the adult positions which will be 
available to them.8 It is a consequence of socialization, however, that 
competition cannot be fair, with each having an equal chance to suc-
ceed. Rather, some start with advantages; racial and class segregation 
of neighborhoods and schools — along with the sorting of students 
that occurs within schools — tends to socialize people to anticipate 
(and to acquire abilities suiting them for) different social positions. 
While equal competitive opportunity is advanced as an ideal, social 
practices needed for stability make that ideal unattainable.
We are assuming inequality of income and wealth; monetary 
inequality combined with rationalization has the consequence that 
those with greater income and wealth are more esteemed. We tend to 
aspire to the best life available to us. But the best lives are of limited 
availability. So we tend to compete for them. But competition can 
destabilize things. So the competition is rigged by socialization to 
exclude many from competing and make the residual competition 
unfair. This works through familiar racial and class injustices.
So far I have argued that two tendencies  make distributive justice 
impossible: first, where income and wealth are distributed unequally, 
they are sources of unequal esteem, which is positional in a way harmful 
to those who have less; second, because of socialization, competition for 
advantage will not be fair. Hence those with less are unjustly harmed.
3. Why Not Equality?
There are two problems with equalizing income and wealth, one 
transitional and the other sociological. The transitional problem 
8 How is the Socialization Principle related to the Rationalization Principle? They are separate 
social tendencies with different sources. The Rationalization Principle identifies a tendency 
in how we think  about our society, a tendency which is a result of stability and hence the 
invisibility of any possible social change. In contrast, the Socialization Principle identifies 
a tendency in social organization  to train people for positions only in numbers that approxi-
mate the numbers of positions that will be available to them. The source of the Socialization 
Principle is in the tendency of societies not to harbor social practices that would lead to 
social instability.
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derives from the positionality of both social esteem and wealth. Equal-
ization would create positional winners and losers in equal numbers. 
Since those who had greater economic resources would be the los-
ers, they could be expected to resist ferociously and to have greater 
power to make their resistance effective. In addition there are further 
problems in how people would perceive change from the point of 
view of their own responsibilities: as parents, the more advantaged 
see themselves as having a moral responsibility to convey advantage to 
their children. Equalization of wealth would deprive their children of 
a current advantage, and parents might conceive acquiescence with 
equalization as a betrayal of their parental responsibilities. Thus there 
would likely be formidable barriers to a transition from inequality to 
equality in income and wealth.
More important, a society with equal income and wealth makes 
no sense sociologically. We are assuming that money is an instrumen-
tal good; we use it to obtain things we need or want. Now suppose 
all agreed that no one should have more wealth than another, that 
they accepted what G. A. Cohen called an “egalitarian ethos.” How 
would people participate in economic relations with others, in buying 
and selling or in negotiating compensation for labor? If money is an 
instrumental good, people would try to acquire more or spend what 
they have wisely. But, by hypothesis — if income and wealth are to 
remain equal — it is impossible to acquire more, and all agree that 
it should be impossible for one to acquire more than another. Are 
we to imagine that people try to do something even knowing it to be 
impossible? That makes no sense. As to spending one’s money wisely: 
are we to acquire things as cheaply as possible? Should we shop at a 
Wal-Mart, where wages and prices are lower? Why would workers care 
about their wages, since income and wealth are to be equal? It is hard 
to know what one is to imagine in imagining a society where income 
and wealth are equal and all agree that they should be.9
Someone might reply that there would be a division of labor: 
while ordinary people try to acquire as much wealth as possible, the 
institutions of justice prevent inequality. But then the institutions will 
seem irrational and unjust to people judging them from the point 
9 Carens, 1981 argues for a system where post-tax incomes are equal but people participate 
in market relations as income and wealth maximizers because pre-tax income is a mark of 
one’s social contribution, and people are motivated morally to maximize social contribution. 
There are a number of problems with this proposal (Gomberg, 2007, 146–47).
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of view of their ordinary purposes and of the norms of social justice 
implicit in everyday economic relations (one is entitled to compensa-
tion negotiated in good faith). The appearance of irrationality is a 
result of retaining norms of economic relations which allow inequality 
(enrich oneself through fair bargaining) and combining them with 
social norms that are in contradiction with these. Because distributive 
equality will seem irrational, it is impossible to implement.
4. The Problem Is Not Just Distributive Justice; 
It Is the Money Economy
The problem with distributive justice is this: wishing to be neu-
tral between controversial conceptions of what makes life good, phi-
losophers propose money as a measure of who gets what. But money 
turns out not to be neutral in its effects. Money is distributed either 
equally or unequally. If unequally, money, being an all-purpose good, 
serves as a mark of social status, an effect of rationalization, leading 
to contempt for folks with less money; this contempt is intensified by 
positionality and status rivalry. Moreover, competition for status, due 
to socialization, will not be fair. I am not saying that any of this is what 
theorists such as Rawls intend — far from it. But the effects of making 
money a central instrumental good would defeat the egalitarian and 
non-competitive elements of their theories. If money is distributed 
equally, the resulting society would make no sense to people inside it.
The problem is the social relations in any society where money serves 
as a central means. Money-based societies create pernicious harms. So 
other conceptions of justice are vulnerable to the same arguments. 
A communitarian view of justice which retained a money economy 
would, in practice, lead to the same unjust harms I have explained 
here. And pluralist conceptions of justice, such as Michael Walzer’s, 
also are undermined by the arguments here: in practice pluralism of 
norms gives way to the hegemony of money (Gomberg, 2007, 86–88).
Students of Karl Marx may also recognize a criticism here of what 
he called the “first phase of communist society” in Critique of the Gotha 
Programme (1974b, 347). This “first phase” has generally come to be 
called “socialism,” a money economy where workers receive wages for 
their labor and exchange these wages for commodities. In Critique of 
the Gotha Programme Marx describes it as the worker contributing to 
society “his individual quantum of labor” and receiving back from 
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this communist society a certificate representing this quantity of labor 
(minus deductions for goods that are communal and shared by all); 
that certificate can in turn be exchanged for goods from “the social 
supply of the means of consumption”; the amount of goods received 
represents the same quantity of labor as the quantity the worker has 
contributed through her labor. Marx recognizes that the principle at 
work is an exchange of equal values, that the workers’ right to goods 
is “a bourgeois right,” and that “this equal right  still constantly suffers 
from a bourgeois limitation.” He points out that workers are unequal 
in their abilities to work hard and produce and hence that an equal 
right is a right to inequality, that one will receive more for her labor 
than another. Of course, Marx thought that in a later phase of com-
munist society (usually called “communism” simpliciter),
when the enslaving subjugation of individuals to the division of labour, and 
the antithesis between intellectual and physical labour has disappeared; 
when labour is no longer just a means of keeping alive but has become a 
vital need; when the all-round development of individuals has also increased 
their productive powers and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more 
abundantly — only then can society wholly cross the narrow horizon of 
bourgeois right and inscribe on its banner: From each according to abilities, 
to each according to needs! (1974b, 347; also 346–47.)
The present paper challenges Marx’s view of the transition from the 
first to the higher phase of communism: if revolutionaries build social 
relations that entrench bourgeois right and if (as I have argued would 
happen) these social relations are internalized and rationalized by 
individuals in socialist society, why think that the promised transition 
to communist society would occur? Wouldn’t a return to fully capitalist 
society make more sense to people living in that socialist society (based 
on bourgeois right) than would a transition to a communist society 
based on a totally different conception of the purpose of labor, not to 
receive goods but to fulfill our humanity? Looked at in this light, the 
argument of the paper so far can be regarded as a partial account of 
why socialist revolutions in Russia, China, and elsewhere gave way to 
capitalism rather than to communism.10
10 While I am responsible for the development of the idea that socialism and communism are 
fundamentally contradictory ways of organizing society, the idea is not original with me. See 
Anonymous, 1982.
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The problem with Marx’s account of the first phase of communism 
is the same as with theories of distributive justice and other concep-
tions that rely implicitly on money and market economies: money 
and markets imply their own principles of right and justice (and have 
their own sociological consequences, as I argued); as Marx recognized, 
the moral principle implied in market exchanges is bourgeois. The 
conception of justice implies that each should receive the equivalent 
of what she contributes to society and is grounded in a principle of 
equality. We labor to receive a just reward in exchange for our labor. 
Why should this notion give way to antithetical reasons why we should 
labor, not in exchange for rights to purchase consumer goods but 
because labor itself is a “vital need”? Here we find our good in advanc-
ing the good of others. We are not concerned with equality.
What dynamic in the first phase of communism would cause “the 
antithesis between intellectual and physical labor” to disappear? When 
Marx’s prescription of two phases of communism was followed, it did 
not disappear nor did “the enslaving subjugation of individuals to the 
division of labour.” No increase in the productive power of labor or in 
social wealth leads to distribution according to need and contribution 
according to ability. The norms governing the two proposed phases 
of communist society are radically opposed.
All of these considerations as well as the arguments of the first 
part of the present paper should lead us to suspect that no society 
founded on market exchange, wage labor, and bourgeois concep-
tions of equality and right would lead us to think of labor as a good. 
Yet Marx thought that in the right circumstances labor was a good. A 
contributive conception of justice starts, then, from the assumption 
that labor is a good, and asks what social organization could allow us 
to recognize it as such. We must show why each would realize a good 
life through social labor. I turn to that task in developing the idea of 
contributive justice.
5. Contributive Justice
Suppose, then, we start from assumptions in the tradition 
descended from Plato and Aristotle, particularly as it came to be recast 
by Marx: there is a human nature and a good for man. This good 
entails at least life as a social being and the development and exercise 
of human intelligence, particularly through labor that contributes 
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to the social group. The term “labor” must be understood broadly 
enough to include a wide variety of human activities that we find valu-
able in one another, and “intelligence” broadly enough to include 
music, art, craft, social skill, and many other important exercises of 
complex ability. Through the development of these abilities and their 
exercise in a way that benefits ourselves and others, we come to think 
well of ourselves for our social contributions, and others think well 
of us for the same reason.
These, then, seem important goods: to develop our abilities, to 
exercise developed abilities in labor that contributes to human good, 
and to earn esteem for those contributions. These may be — I believe 
they are — uncontroversial enough that they could be accepted as 
goods that a just society should make available to all. That is, a theory 
of justice could start, not from purported neutrality about the nature 
of the good, but from a clear but widely acceptable account of what 
makes a human life good.11 From this point of view, the task of a theory 
of justice is to articulate social norms by which these important goods 
might be available to all. These are norms of contributive justice.
Under what social conditions would labor naturally be recognized 
as a good? In the Grundrisse  Marx criticized Adam Smith’s labor theory 
of value because it assumed that to labor was to sacrifice one’s freedom 
and happiness. Smith found this assumption natural, Marx writes, 
because he was thinking of labor particularly as wage-labor where it 
“appears as repulsive, always as external forced labor.” The subordination 
of the worker to the boss, where the worker must work in order to 
survive and must obey others in her labor, makes labor repulsive to 
the worker. Labor as self-realization requires that workers control the 
process of production, not be subordinated to it; they must exercise 
their will in deciding how production is to occur. We control our own 
labor often in work we do for ourselves, repairing our homes or cars, 
where we can make effective decisions and plan the labor process and 
carry out our own plan. Social labor can be controlled by the worker 
only when workers apply scientific knowledge to the labor process and 
decide collectively how it is to be organized (Marx, 1973, 610–12). 
When our labor is subordinated to a boss, it oppresses us; when we 
control our labor, it is a good.
11 The goods I have described here do not exhaust what is good but are important goods for 
all; see Gomberg, 2007, Chapter 6. Class societies make it impossible for all to obtain these 
goods simultaneously.
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There is a second social condition necessary to recognizing labor 
as a good. When some do relatively simple labor requiring little train-
ing while others carry out more complex tasks often requiring exten-
sive prior training, inevitably a negative stigma attaches to the simple 
labor and the worker who does it.12 Labor can only be recognized as a 
good when this division of labor is overcome, when, because everyone 
does a share of the simple work, this labor no longer carries a nega-
tive stigma. Overcoming the division of simple from complex labor 
(essentially a restatement of what Marx called “the antithesis between 
intellectual and physical labor”) requires that simple and complex 
labor be shared by all. When simple labor is shared no one’s life is 
consumed with it. All have opportunity and social encouragement to 
develop more complex abilities with the expectation that they will be 
able to contribute these abilities to the good of others, once mastery is 
demonstrated. In mastering more complex abilities and contributing 
them we naturally earn esteem from ourselves and others. Similarly 
the contribution of simple labor also inspires esteem (once a nega-
tive stigma is removed from it) because those contributions enhance 
our lives.
Sharing simple and complex labor is necessary for the following 
reason: when labor is divided, greater esteem attaches naturally to the 
more complex labor. We feel an enhancement of self-esteem whenever 
we master a task which had previously been beyond our abilities. Teach-
ers or entertainers who master complex difficult tasks naturally draw 
our admiration. So mastery of complexity naturally inspires esteem. 
No act of will can make us have the same admiration for contribution 
of simple labor that anyone can do as we have for the contribution 
of very difficult tasks that take years of intense training to master. 
Hence it does not make sense to suppose that, in a society where some 
do simple and others more complex labor, we will somehow will to 
esteem them equally. Moreover, in a society that divides simple and 
complex labor, those who do the simpler labor will be stigmatized as 
stupid because of the labor they do (an effect of the Rationalization 
Principle). But dividing labor also leads to socializing many for simpler 
labor (the Socialization Principle). In order to remove the stigma from 
12 It is also true that simple labor is usually accompanied with closer supervision, while those 
who do more skilled labor are not closely supervised at all (think of the ”supervision” of 
college teachers, which is very loose). So the second condition for recognizing labor as a 
good is related to the first: workers must be and recognize themselves as being self-governing.
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simple labor it must be shared by all. Therefore, justice requires that 
simple labor be shared. Similarly sharing complex labor is necessary 
in order to create social circumstances where each has opportunity 
to earn esteem from contribution of more complex mastery. Once 
labor-sharing removes the stigma attached to simple labor, we can 
enjoy the esteem that naturally attaches to doing necessary (even if 
simple) tasks as well as the esteem naturally attached to more complex 
contributions.
A society of contributive justice (one based on Marx’s principle, 
“from each according to ability, to each according to need”13) would 
make normative the natural connection between contributing to soci-
ety and esteem for those who contribute. Naturally we esteem those 
who contribute to a project with which we identify, and contributions 
to a society that we embrace as our own are hence naturally esteemed. 
Norms of contributive justice attach normative esteem to these con-
tributions. Consider a parallel: We naturally regard parenting as a 
great good and naturally esteem ourselves and others who devote 
themselves to parenting. But we also consider it a parent’s duty to care 
for and nurture the development of a child. We esteem those who 
do this because they are doing what they should do as parents; this 
is a normative connection between fulfilling the duties of parenting 
and being esteemed for doing those things. Norms of contributive 
justice make our contributions to society normative: members of a 
social group which supports them and cares for their needs should 
contribute to that group. So, while we naturally regard social contribu-
tion as a good and esteem those who contribute, we also have a duty 
to do so, and normative esteem attaches to those who fulfill this duty.
So contribution is both something that makes our lives good, that 
enables us to flourish, and also a duty of contributive justice. It may 
seem paradoxical that something is both a great good and a duty: if 
it is so good, why do we have to have norms making it a duty? The 
previous analogy to parenting should answer this question. Many of 
us who have raised children have found the experience of doing so 
a great — typically an irreplaceable — good in our lives. Yet parent-
ing is a duty. Why? Because sometimes we don’t feel like meeting the 
great demands in time and energy that parenting can place on us. 
13 I say nothing here about what is a need; there is a brief discussion of this issue and other 
issues related to distribution in Gomberg, 2007, 162–63.
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It can easily take up a lot of time that we might rather spend doing 
something else. So it shouldn’t be too surprising that we need norms 
to insure that the needs of our children are met — even though it is 
true that in meeting them we realize our own good. The same will 
be true of contributive duties: sometimes we just may not feel like 
getting up and doing our share of the necessary labor; we may feel 
like doing something else. So we need to recognize contribution as 
a duty even if it is a great good.
Both sides of this need to be explained further: why contribution is 
a good and why it is a duty. Let’s start with why it is a good. Is it human 
nature to find our good through advancing the good of others? The 
research team led by Michael Tomasello has studied children for evi-
dence of helping behavior, finding that children as young as 18 months 
tend to help others and will even interrupt their own activity to do so. 
Giving extrinsic rewards for helping tends to diminish their helping 
behavior (once the rewards are removed), evidence that they find help-
ing intrinsically rewarding. Human children share much more readily 
than chimpanzees and display a sense of fairness which chimpanzees 
lack (Tomasello, 2009). Tomasello’s research findings coincide with 
ethnographic studies of gatherer–hunter communities in contrast to 
chimpanzee communities: while humans organize food sharing through 
a camp, where hunted and gathered foods are brought back and shared 
according to norms, chimpanzees eat as they go, sharing only occasion-
ally and reluctantly (even chimpanzee mothers are reluctant to share 
foods with their infants; their begging only gains them the inferior 
parts). We evolved in social groups where humans fed one another.14 
It is deep in human nature for us to find our good in contributing to 
the good of others in the social life of a community.
We also need to understand why, in a society based on contributive 
justice, contribution to the good of others will readily be recognized 
as a duty. By the norms of contributive justice each cares for the good 
of others in familiar ways: providing food, transportation, building 
housing or public buildings, providing health care or other services. 
Each individual sees others providing for her. So it will make sense 
to her to do her part in this system; this is a duty of contributing and 
is easily recognized as such.
14 The literature on foragers is immense; but see Leacock and Lee, 1982, and the essays col-
lected there.
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Let us now consider three possible problems with or objections to 
contributive justice. First, wouldn’t competitiveness now characteristic 
of ambitious people persist? I believe not. Sharing labor makes oppor-
tunity unlimited. So we would naturally view others differently, not as 
competitors for limited goods (so that if you get into medical school, 
my chances are reduced) but as people whose developed abilities will 
enhance my life. Either you aspire to develop complex abilities in an 
area different from mine or in the same area. In the first case, your 
development of musical ability enriches my life just as my contribution 
of philosophy can enrich yours; our abilities are complementary. In 
the second case, your development of ability also enhances my life: I 
wish to write, think, and teach as well as possible; your development 
as a philosopher and philosophy teacher should enrich my life by 
surrounding me with others who can help me to do my work better 
just as I can help them. So in either case we have a natural reason to 
encourage others in the development of their abilities.
Second, what if everyone wants to do particle physics and no one 
wants to work on public health? Couldn’t we have too many wanting 
to work in one area and not enough in another? Here I believe the 
natural desire to contribute should lead to people choosing to develop 
their abilities in areas where those abilities are needed. If the field of 
particle physics is crowded, the opportunity of each to make a contri-
bution is somewhat diminished (although the work should be better 
because so many are collaborating on finding answers); if people are 
needed to work on public health, the opportunity to contribute is 
enhanced for people who enter the field. Assuming that each desires 
to contribute, we should naturally distribute the development of abili-
ties to the areas where those abilities are needed.
Third, we should deal with the objection that even in a society 
based on contributive justice the problem of people being thought 
inferior will persist: after all, not everyone’s contributions will be 
equal to those of others, and those who make the lesser contri-
butions will naturally be thought inferior, by both themselves and 
others. I believe this objection imports a bourgeois way of thinking 
into a society of contributive justice. In capitalist society there is no 
shared sense of what is good. We tend to measure ourselves relative 
to others quantitatively, by income or wealth. There is positional 
competition. These are indeed characteristic of the social psychology 
of capitalist society. In sports, we value being number one. But this 
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psychology is the result of our not sharing a sense of the intrinsic 
value of what we do.
In a society of contributive justice our contributions are genu-
inely valuable to others; they make their lives better. Of course, we 
are capable of comparing who did more and who did less, but the 
comparisons are not very important. Consider a comparison of John 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice  with Eva Feder Kittay’s Love’s Labor. No doubt, 
if forced to rank them, we would agree that Rawls’ is the greater con-
tribution. But who cares? Kittay made an important criticism of the 
Rawlsian approach to justice, pointing out that dependency on oth-
ers and doing the labor of caring for dependent people are central 
to our social experience and must be accounted for in any adequate 
theory of justice. I think Kittay’s point is right and will lead to a better 
approach to social justice. It is an important contribution and one 
that leads others naturally to esteem what she has done and, I assume, 
leads her to feel proud of her contribution. It is simply not important 
that someone else made a greater contribution; each contribution has 
its own importance and hence should ground self-pride and social 
esteem. We seek the opportunity to contribute and make a difference 
to people’s lives, and a society of contributive justice makes such an 
opportunity available to all simultaneously and non-competitively. 
So, I conclude, the problem of people being shamed by lesser con-
tributions is not a real worry. We are not concerned to measure the 
quantity of social esteem. We are respected for contributions that are 
real and important.
In a society based on principles of contributive justice each is able 
to have a good life. Sharing labor, each does a fair share of the simple, 
routine labor according to ability; each has the opportunity and social 
encouragement to develop and contribute more complex abilities 
because this labor too is shared. Because our abilities tend to comple-
ment one another, each flourishes by enabling others to flourish; “the 
free development of each is the condition for the free development 
of all.” Each develops a positive opinion of herself because of the 
esteem earned by contributing both simple and complex labor. Each 
has reason to accept the fundamental norms of contributive justice: 
that each contribute simple labor; that each develop her abilities; that 
each contribute developed abilities; that each share developed abili-
ties by teaching others; that each encourage others in doing simple 
labor, developing more complex abilities, and contributing these; 
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that each has the opportunity and encouragement to participate in 
social decision-making about how society is to be organized. While 
inevitably some will not be fully socialized to principles of contribu-
tive justice, will fail to contribute (or to contribute what they could), 
and will not win the esteem of others for their contributions, these 
should be at a minimum because of the social encouragement each 
would naturally receive.
Considering the good of contributing to a social group, the central 
problem of justice is how to make this good  available to all simultane-
ously and non-competitively, to make this good available in unlimited 
supply. This problem has a solution, which is to share labor. Sharing 
the simple tasks has the consequence that no one’s life is consumed 
with simple labor; each has opportunity and social support in the 
development and contribution of more complex abilities.
When contribution is the central good of concern to social justice, 
rivalry over goods which are marks of status disappears. When we 
become obsessed with the things money can buy for the social esteem 
they can win for us, we become less happy. This tendency arises at least 
partly from another: we don’t love our work and feel confident that 
what we do has value in making life better for ourselves and others. 
In contrast, if labor is useful to others and we derive pleasure from it 
for that reason and for its intrinsic interest and challenge (assuming 
here that labor sharing gives everyone an opportunity to contribute 
more complex abilities to society), then we can find meaning and 
satisfaction in our lives. We can enjoy respect from others and from 
ourselves for something of genuine value. Contributive justice solves 
problems that distributive justice cannot.
6. Getting There
That leaves the question of how we get from capitalist society 
based on bourgeois conceptions of right and justice to the society of 
contributive justice based on the principle “from each according to 
ability, to each according to need.” I argued earlier that the answer 
Marx proposed in the Critique of the Gotha Programme was wrong. But 
other things Marx wrote suggest a better answer. In The German Ideology 
Marx and Engels describe the workers’ appropriation of the forces 
of production as “self-activity.” In describing and analyzing the Paris 
Commune of 1871 Marx wrote that the communards “know that in 
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order to work out their own emancipation . . . they will have to pass 
through long struggles . . . transforming circumstances and men.” 
Marx describes how “plain working men . . . performed their work [of 
governing Paris] modestly, conscientiously, and efficiently” and did 
so for modest wages (Marx and Engels, 1976, 87; Marx, 1974a, 213).
Admittedly the Commune did not abolish money. However, more 
to the point, the wages the communards received for governing this 
new working-class society — were these wages a compensation for their 
expenditure of effort? Or was their labor of “work[ing] out their own 
emancipation” a form of self-activity and self-realization? Were their 
wages merely the means of providing the necessities that would enable 
them to contribute? Marx never explicitly addressed this question, 
but it seems to me that he regarded the work of the communards as 
self-activity that did not require pay as a form of compensation but 
(since the commune had not abolished money) as a means of enabling 
them to do their work. If so, then their work and the pay they received 
were not  based on “bourgeois right,” including the right to inequal-
ity for those who did more work. Rather, revolutionaries carried out 
revolutionary activity for its own sake.
The same question — the same alternatives of working in order 
to make a living in bourgeois society versus working to build an 
anti-capitalist movement — exists for activists today. Some “activist– 
entrepreneurs” see themselves as carving out a living for themselves 
and regard the money they earn as pay to which they are entitled. 
Others — more revolutionary in their thinking and way of living — 
may receive subsistence pay in exchange for “working for the move-
ment,” but the pay is to provide for their needs so that they can do 
revolutionary work. When participants in the various Occupy move-
ments performed the necessary work of providing food, organizing 
sanitation and cleaning up, and making sure that the medical or other 
special needs of their fellow occupiers were met, they were doing what 
they believed needed to be done, and they believed in that work. In 
their intercourse with the surrounding capitalist society, the occupiers 
needed money. But they typically did their work out of commitment, 
not for money.
Similarly, we can look at the movements that exist today to see 
whether the leaders think they are above performing the necessary 
menial tasks of tidying up or cleaning. Do they carry out in practice the 
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unity of mental and manual labor (of complex and simple labor) to 
which the “higher phase of communism” aspires? Here again I am sure 
we see both practices among those who would label themselves “anti-
capitalist.” However, my suggestion is that the movements that would 
overthrow capitalism must already carry out communist forms of life.
These communist practices within the anti-capitalist movement 
form the material basis for a society based on principles of contribu-
tive justice. In participating in these movements we find a form of 
self-realization. Those of us with other jobs certainly do not expect to 
be paid for our political activity; we participate out of commitment. 
So the material basis of a fully communist society is to be found in 
spreading that commitment as widely as possible. A decisive critical 
mass of the working class and its allies must participate in revolu-
tionary anti-capitalist struggle out of commitment; that critical mass 
will then organize a new society based on principles of contributive 
justice. The political work they do in building this new society is 
not done to earn a paycheck but out of commitment. That same 
commitment can be extended to labor producing the necessities of 
life: if workers do not receive pay for working, then their motivation 
is political, to enable a new non-capitalist social order to succeed. 
But then they are already practicing the principle of Marx’s higher 
phase of communism, working according to their abilities and com-
mitment and receiving what they need in order to contribute (as 
everyone would, whether they worked or not). The struggle then 
is to persuade enough people to make this society work by doing 
the necessary productive labor. I have argued here that part of that 
process must also be to share simple labor, encourage all to develop 
other abilities, and share the contribution of these complex abilities 
as well; these practices prevent the working class from being divided 
into skilled, highly trained workers and others who do simple labor 
and are stigmatized thereby. Sharing labor enables all to experience 
self-realization through the contribution of labor. This is a society 
of contributive justice.
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